孰输孰赢

冬晨逸雪

Winners and losers 孰输孰赢

Charlemagne

Winners and losers

Europe is a big winner from globalisation. If only politicians would say so

欧洲是全球化的最大赢家，但政治家们可不这么看

                                    Illustration by Peter Schrank

“LETus be frank about it: most of our people have never had it so good,” aBritish prime minister, Harold Macmillan, once said. The phrase enteredthe political lexicon, and “Supermac” went on to win re-election in1959. The lesson seems clear enough: for a politician, delivering goodnews is a winner.

　　英国的前首相哈诺德.麦克米兰曾经过说：“坦率的说，大多数欧洲人从来没有对全球化有什么好的看法”。全球化这个词成了政治词汇中的一部分，“超级麦克”（Supermac）在1959年第二次当选首相。这里所传达的信息是不言而喻的：对于政治家而言，发布好消息就是赢家。

　　If only it werethat simple. Half a century on, a growing body of research makes thecase that, contrary to widespread belief, globalisation has made lifebetter for most European citizens. What is more, Europe is unusuallygood at it. Yet political leaders seem wary of delivering the goodnews. With few exceptions, the political rhetoric when it comes toglobalisation ranges from grim resolve (this challenge can be managed)to plain grim (we must tame this menace). Defending globalisation isleft to a cottage industry of think-tanks, academics and businesslobbies (although some of the most thoughtful studies are quietlyfinanced by pro-market governments, from Finland to the Netherlands, orby the European Union).

　　事情要是那么简单就好了。半个世纪以来，越来越多的研究表明：全球化让大多数的欧洲居民生活得更好了，这与人们普遍持有的观点完全相反。然而政治领袖们似乎对发布好消息比较谨慎。当谈及全球化之时，从坚定的决心（grim resolve）
（如这种挑战是可以应对的）到绝对的坚定（plain grim）（如我们必须抑制这样威胁）这样的言语就会出现在政治辞令中，很少有例外。为全球化辩护的任务就落到一小部分的智囊人士、学者和商业游说者们的身上了（虽然其中一部分最具思想深度的研究暗中得到了支持市场经济的政府的支助，比如芬兰，荷兰，或者欧盟）。

　　What is going on?Politics, mostly. Today's Europeans fear that globalisation may not begood for most people. Or, to be more precise, even if they notice thediffuse benefits (cheap jeans and high-tech gadgets), they fret aboutthe visible losers, starting with workers whose jobs are shippedoverseas. Worse, with globalisation disrupting business models at anever finer level of detail many citizens feel they cannot be sure ifthey will be next.

　　到底是怎么回事呢？主要是政治在作祟。现在的欧洲人担心全球化可能对大多数人是不利的。或者确切来说，即使他们注意到了全球化带来的好处（廉价的牛仔裤和高科技产品），他们也会为显而易见的失败者但到不安，首先令他们担心的是工人，他们的工作都被海外工厂夺走了。更糟糕的是，全球化越来越细地分化了商业的运作模式，
许多人觉得不能确定自己是不是下一个受到影响的人。

　　A new book* by apair of academics from America's Johns Hopkins University finds lots offacts to cheer Europeans up. European consumers (ie, all Europeans whenthey are shopping) are big winners from globalisation, which hasdelivered cheap imports, held down inflation and kept interest rateslow. Despite the fuss about China and India, the EU's share of worldexports rose slightly between 2000 and 2006. What is more, two-thirdsof Chinese exports involve foreign brands, a good chunk of which areEuropean. Nor does a “made in China” tag mean big revenues for Chinesefirms. In a recent speech defending globalisation, the EU tradecommissioner, Peter Mandelson, cited a University of California studyinto who gains when an iPod is sold in America for $299. Only $4 staysin China with the firms that assemble the devices, Mr Mandelsonexplained. $160 goes to American companies that design, transport andretail iPods. A similar pattern holds for many European products.

　　美国约翰霍普金大学的两位学者出版了一本新书，列举了许多事实来让振奋欧洲人。欧洲的消费者（也就是所有购物的欧洲人）是全球化的最大赢家，全球化让进口变得便宜，抑制通货膨胀，保持低利率。尽管对中国和印度有些担忧，但欧盟的出口在世界上所占的份额在2000年至2006年间稍稍有所增加。而且，中国三分之二的出口都是外国品牌，其中很大一部分是欧洲的。“中国制造”的标签也不意味着收益就归中国公司了。在最近为全球化辩解的讲话中，欧盟委员会的贸易专员彼得.曼德尔森引用了加利福尼亚大学的一项关于研究，该研究调查ipod在美国以299美元出售时，是谁获了利。曼德尔森说在中国负责组装的公司只拿其中的4美元。而美国负责iPod设计、运输和零售的公司拿了160美元。许多欧洲产品也是如此。

　　　Europeans worry alot about wage competition. The researchers note that globalisation isnot just about wages, but more broadly about finding efficienciesanywhere along complex supply chains. After all, most non-EU employeesof European firms live in America, not China (EU and Swiss firms employsome 3.5m workers in America). Yes, European jobs have been lost byoffshoring, but unevenly. In France only 3.4% of jobs lost in 2005could be blamed on offshoring, though there has been a wave of factoryclosures more recently (see article). Portugal has suffered more: aquarter of its job losses between 2003 and 2006 involved jobs headingoverseas, mostly to new EU members.

　　欧洲人特别担心工资方面的竞争。研究者说全球化并不只是关于工资，从更广的角度来讲，是在任何地方的复杂的供应链中找到最大的效率者。毕竟，在欧洲公司工作的非欧盟的员工都是美国人，而非中国人（欧盟和瑞士在美国雇佣大约350万的员工）。确实，欧洲的工作被外国人拿走了，但分配并不均匀。而法国2005年只有3.4%的动作被外国人拿走，虽然最近刮起了一阵工厂关门的风。葡萄牙损失更大：2003到2006年间，四分之一的工作都是被外来者拿走，主要是来自欧盟的新成员国。

　　Stick to the data,and globalisation Angst in Europe can look like the tail wagging thedog. Italian producers have demanded anti-dumping duties of tens ofmillions of euros on Chinese air compressors, to preserve just 500jobs. Yet in a political world, data get you only so far. A politicianseen as heartless towards 500 workers risks punishment by millions ofwatching voters. EU economies may have created 18m more jobs than theyshed in the past decade. But the jobs are different: like America,Europe has shed manufacturing and farming jobs, and created new ones inservices. Many Europeans suspect these of being precarious andlow-paid. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France is not alone in fuellingsuch suspicions, visiting factories to vow that France will remain anindustrial power—with state help if need be—and deriding those who saythat services are the future.

　　欧洲人关注这些数据，对于全球化的产生的焦虑就有些本木倒置。意大利的生产商要求对中国产的空气压缩机征收成千上万的反倾销关税，仅仅是为了保护500个工作岗位。然而在政治社会中，数据也只能做到如此。看似对500个工人无情的政客冒险面对数百万盯着他的选民的惩罚。欧盟成员国可能比过去十年多创造出1800多万个的工作机会。但这些工作是不同的：像美国一样，欧洲也有制造业和农业方面的工作，在服务业也创造了新的工作机会。许多欧洲人怀疑这些工作不稳定，薪水低。对于这种观点的支持，也并不是法国总统尼古拉斯.萨科奇一人，他参观了工厂，发誓说法国将会仍然是个工业强国----如果有必要的话，国家会提供帮助----对于那些认为服务业是未来的发展趋势的说法他嗤之以鼻。

Services français
服务业与法国

　　Such populismwilfully ignores European strengths. France has a particular genius forexporting services (if you are after striking symbols, a French firm,Sodexo, feeds both the American Marines and the British garrison on theFalklands). Furthermore, wages and conditions in services vary widely;and not all factory jobs were fun. Yet Mr Sarkozy and his kind may beexpressing something else: a sense that a shift towards globally tradedservices involves a loss of control. Many Europeans have grown up incorporatist systems, dominated by trade unions, employers' groups andpoliticians. Globalisation is bad for such a model. That can beliberating, if annoying to French Gaullists. But it can be bruising aswell.

　　这种平民论有意忽略了欧洲的力量。法国很擅长出口服务（如果你想要看到明显例子，那就是Sodexo，它为美国海军和英国驻福克兰岛的军队提供后勤补给）。而且服务业的工资和条件相差很大；也并不是所有的工厂的工作都那么有趣。但是萨科奇先生和他的同僚们可能表达的是另外一种意思：就是服务全球化转变会带来失控的状况。许多欧洲人成长都离不开社团体制，比如工会、雇主协会及政客们。全球化有损这种社团模式。如果法国的戴高乐主义者们对此不喜欢的话，那种状况是可以改变的。但同时也会带来伤痛。

　　Globalisation isone reason why European wage demands have been so restrained in recentyears. It is easier for bosses to say no when workers fear that theirjobs might be shipped to Shenzhen. That has been good for EUcompetitiveness. But it is not nice to hear your boss making thethreat. Arguably, the European model has more niceness built into itthan the American version, thanks to social safety nets of varioussorts. Some, like Denmark's pricey “flexicurity”, look tailor-made fora globalised world thanks to their focus on supporting and retrainingindividual workers, not protecting jobs.

　　全球化是最近几年欧洲工资上涨要求受到限制的一个原因。当工人们担心他们的工作机会会流入到深圳，老板很容易就可以拒绝他们的提高工资的要求。这有利于提高欧盟的竞争能力。但听到你的老板威胁的话语总是感觉不好的。欧洲模式比美国模式要有更多的好处，这要归功于其形式各样的社会保障网络。有些好像专门就是为全球化定制的，比如丹麦昂贵的“灵活福利计划”，这是由于他们强调的是帮助工人，并提供再就业培训，而不是保障工作机会。

　　Politicians shouldnot skate over risks (to be fair, in his 1957 speech, even Mr Macmillanconfessed to worrying: “is it too good to last?”). But they should notconceal good news from voters, either, just because it runs counter topopular gut instinct. Although many Europeans do not seem to realiseit, globalisation has been good for them—and the protection some cravewould do far more harm than good. Will today's politicians ever befrank enough to tell them?

　　政客们不应该冒险（公平的来说，在他1957年的演说中，麦克米兰先生甚至承认自己有疑虑：“全球化是不是太动听了，难以持久”？）。但他们也不应该仅仅因为它与公众的本能反应相背，就不把好消息告诉选民。全球化对欧洲人已施恩泽，虽然许多欧洲人似乎没有意识到这点----许多人渴望得到的保护会弊多于利。今天的政客们会不会坦率地告诉他们这些呢？

* “Globalisationand Europe: Prospering in the New Whirled Order”. By Daniel S. Hamiltonand Joseph P. Quinlan, Centre for Transatlantic Relations.